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Abstract
We examine the incentives for countries to go to war as they depend on the compar-
ison between how much their pivotal decision-makers have at risk and how much they
stand to gain from a war. How this ratio compares to the country at large is what we
term \political bias." If there is no political bias, then there are always payments that
one country would like to make to the other that will avoid a war in the presence of
commitment or enforceability of peace treaties. If there is a bias on the part of one
or both countries, then war can result and in some cases cannot be prevented by any
transfer payments. We examine how war technology and relative wealth levels interact
with political bias in determining whether countries make transfers, go to war, and form
alliances. Our results shed some new light on the uneven contender paradox and the
interpretation of the \democratic peace".
JEL classication numbers: C78, D74
Key words: War, Political Bias, Alliances, Bargaining, Transfers, Commitment, Demo-
cratic Peace, War Technology
Political Bias and War

Matthew O. Jackson Massimo Morelli
1 Introduction
The rich history of war provides evidence of its devastating consequences and of the
wide variety of circumstances that lead to it.
1
While there is much that we know about
wars, there is still much to be learned about how the choices to go to war dier across
countries and circumstances, and in particular how this relates to economic situations
and political regimes. Although religious and ethnic conicts have played key roles in
many wars, balance of power, territorial disputes, expansion of territory, and access to
key resources or wealth are often either involved or the primary driving force behind
wars.
2
In this paper, we build a model of war based on bargaining that serves as a basis
for understanding how political structure (crudely modeled) interacts with economic
incentives to determine when wars will occur.
Our model of war is described as follows. Two countries are faced with a possible war,
and each knows their respective probability of winning, which depends on their respective
wealth levels. If a war ensues, each country incurs a cost, and then the victor claims a
portion of the loser's wealth. The incentives of each country thus depend on the costs,
the potential spoils, and the probability that each will win. If either country wishes to
go to war then war ensues. Countries can oer to give (or receive) some transfer in order
to forgo a war.

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See, for example, Blainey [2] and Kaiser [20].
2
Resources and wealth are the focus of much of the recent formal literature on war, as discussed
below. Moreover, materialistic motivations have been identied as primary source of wars in the history
of empires (see, for example, Harris [15] and Findlay [13]), and some scholars argue that modernization
has further increased the protability of conquest (see Liberman [24] who discusses Hitler's exploitation
of occupied territories during World War II). A recent example of a war related to materialistic expansion
motivations is the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. We stress that by materialistic motivations we include
power and control motivations of country leaders, and hence our arguments apply even when no territory
or resource is a cause of war.
The way in which we tie the analysis back to political structure is crude but powerful.
We model a country's decisions through the eyes of the pivotal decision-maker in the
society. For instance, this could be an executive, monarch, military leader, or the median
voter. The ratio of relative share of benets from war compared to share of costs for this
pivotal agent is thus a critical determinant of a country's decisions. We call this ratio
\political bias." If it is close to one, then the country's critical decision maker's relative
benets/costs are similar to the country at large. If this ratio is greater than one, then we
say that the country leader has a \positive bias". An unbiased leader is \representative"
of the interests of the country, in the sense that he or she sees the same relative benets
and costs from a war as the country does as a whole. Hence unbiasedness may be seen
as an operationalization of a representativeness property associated with the level of
democracy of a political regime.
Political bias essentially embodies anything that might lead to dierent incentives
for the critical decision maker relative to the society as a whole. For instance, in an
authoritarian regime, it might be that a leader can keep a disproportionate share of the
gains from a war. It might also be that the leader sees other gains from war, in personal
recognition or power. Similarly, if the military is leading a country, then it may be that
military leaders gain disproportionately from war in terms of accumulated power, or even
in keeping their troops occupied. These eects are not unique to autocratic or oligarchic
regimes, but can also occur in democracies.
3
Sometimes a leader knows that (s)he is more
easily reelected if the country is at war at the time of the elections, or may have other
indirect benets in terms of beneting friends or companies to which he or she has ties.
It is also important to note that bias can also go in the other direction. For instance, if
a democratic leader risks losing oÆce if a war is lost then that might lead him or her to
over-weight the costs of war relative to gains, resulting in a bias factor less than one.
4
We show that if both countries have unbiased leaders then war can be avoided, pro-
vided the countries can make transfers and provided they can commit to peace conditional
on receiving transfers. However, if either country has a leader with positive bias, then
war can ensue, and whether or not it does depends on the specics of the war technol-
ogy, relative wealths, potential costs and spoils of war, and the size of the biases. We
also study such bargaining when neither country can commit to peace after receiving
transfers.
5
Here the incentives are more complicated, as it must be that after receiving
3
An argument in favor of the hypothesis that democracies tend to be less biased can be found in Lake
[23]: \State rent seeking creates an imperialist bias in a country's foreign policy. This bias is smallest
in democracies, where the costs to society of controlling the state are relatively low, and greatest in
autocracies, where the costs are higher."
4
For an analysis of the political costs of war for dierent regimes, see Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson
[4] and Chiozza and Goemans [6]. Our notions of costs and benets include the risk of losing power
after a war, as one of the many elements that enter the cost-benet calculation of a political leader. See
Downs and Rocke [8] for a detailed discussion of the incentives of an executive to engage in war relative
to the electorate's incentives to retain the executive.
5
This commitment problem is usually studied in dynamic models. For example, in Schwarz and Sonin
[31] war can be avoided with a continuous stream of transfers that comes at a fast enough rate to always
have the aggressor wish to delay rather than attack.
2
a transfer, a war would no longer be worthwhile for the potential aggressor.
6
When
peace treaties are not enforceable, even two countries with unbiased leaders (or, in short,
unbiased countries) may go to war, depending on the \war technology."
Our model thus suggests some novel considerations regarding the so-called \Demo-
cratic Peace" (or \Liberal Peace") observation, where two democracies are much less
likely to go to war with each other than are two countries when at least one is not a
democracy (e.g., see Doyle [9] and Russett [29]). We show that at most one of two
unbiased countries will want to go to war, and if binding treaties can be written, then
two unbiased countries can always reach an agreement over transfers that will avoid a
war. We can call this unbiased peace, and it can be interpreted as a new explanation
of the democratic peace observation under the hypothesis that democracies tend to be
less biased than non democratic regimes.
7
Wars between democracies are avoided not
due to similarity of norms or cultural aÆnities, but due to a lack of political bias in the
bargaining process (determined perhaps by the system of checks and balances typical of
a democracy). Our model does predict that two politically biased democracies could still
go to war with each other if they are each suÆciently biased. Thus, mutual democracy
is neither a necessary nor suÆcient condition for peace.
Our model also has implications regarding two puzzles often referred to as \paradoxes"
in the literature. First, in our model it is possible for two countries to go to war even
though they both have complete information about the relative likelihood of winning, and
despite the fact that they could bargain and make payments to avoid war and that war
burns resources. This is related to the \Hicks Paradox" from the bargaining literature
that ponders the occurrence of strikes and failed bargaining in general contexts. For
bargaining to break down, one needs some sort of friction or failure in the process, and
there are many that have been discussed with an overwhelming focus on asymmetric
information and dierences in beliefs, but also with some attention to indivisibilities and
agency problems.
8
Our model operates from an agency perspective, where political bias
reects the dierent cost/benet calculation of the agent (the leader or pivotal decision
6
Given that the attention of empirical studies and historians has largely been on wars or armed
conicts that actually occurred, it is diÆcult to nd direct empirical evidence of transfers that helped
avoid a war, for the obvious counterfactual reasons. However, one can certainly see the role of transfers
in many epochs: In the 18th and 19th centuries there was an explicit system of compensations among
European great powers (the rst (1772) and the third partition of Poland (1795) are cases in point);
The most important principle in UN Security Council 242 was \land for peace", and such a principle
was used as the basis for Israel's peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, and was at the center of the Oslo
accords with the PLO; Another example is the provision of iron and logistical support by Sweden to
Hitler for military operation in World War II. A famous example of failure of appeasement due to lack
of commitment is the Munich Agreement of 1938.
7
Using political bias as the key driver of war and assuming a negative correlation between political
bias and the level of democracy, our model provides an explanation of the stylized fact that democracies
tend to win wars against autocracies: Ceteris paribus, biased leaders are willing to enter conicts which
they have a lower probability of winning. See Lake [23] for a related argument.
8
Explanations of wars based on miscalculations or errors due to lack of information or to dierent
priors about relative power have been discussed by Blainey [2], Gartzke [14], Wagner [36], among others.
As argued by Fearon [10], [11], once we allow for bargaining and communication, these explanations
are consistent if there are strategic incentives to hide (or not to reveal) information or problems with
3
maker in the government) who bargains on behalf of the principal (the country). This
explains why wars can happen even when countries have accurate intelligence about each
other's military capabilities, and even when they have the power to bargain and make
transfers to avoid a war.
9
Second, political bias yields an explanation of things like the uneven contenders para-
dox, rst discussed by von Clausewitz [7], which refers to cases in which one small or
weak country doesn't concede even though it expects losses from a war. In our model
the weaker country can in fact be the aggressor because of high bias and/or insensitive
war technology.
We also discuss the stability of peace among larger numbers of countries, allowing for
oensive and defensive alliances. A strong form of stability, where no group of countries
could gain by reorganizing themselves into new alliances, will generally not be attainable
when the war technology is sensitive to relative wealths. This is related to issues of
empty-cores in a variety of coalitional games with some sort of competition. In settings
where core-stability fails, it makes sense to explore weaker forms of stability.
10
We show
that it is possible to sustain large alliances of countries.
Even though in most of our analysis we treat political bias as an exogenous parameter,
we also examine the incentives of citizens to (s)elect leaders of dierent bias. In the
absence of transfers, a country would prefer to have an unbiased leader. On the other
hand, when transfers are available, a country may benet from having a biased leader
who extracts transfers from other countries, provided the bias is not so strong to lead
the country into undesired wars.
To further clarify the connection of this paper with the existing rational choice lit-
erature in international relations (in addition to the connections already identied) note
that in any \realist" framework (a term due to von Clausewitz [7]), war is based on prac-
tical cost/benet calculations and with full knowledge of circumstances. As an example
of rational realist model, Bueno de Mesquita [3] studies war as based on cost/benet
signalling. For work on indivisibilities in bargaining and the relation to war see Kirshner [22]. There
are also various types of spiral theories of war (based on the insights of Waltz [37] and Schelling [30]),
analyzed by Jervis [17], [18]: The game between two contenders who have to decide whether to engage
or not in an arms race is represented as a stag-hunt game, in which each player prefers to arm only if
the other does so. Baliga and Sjostrom [1] have shown that even if there is an innitesimally small belief
that the opponent is someone who would arm no matter what, a spiral of mutual distrust can arise and
lead to an arms race with probability one (in the absence of communication).
9
By transfers we do not refer to explicit monetary transfers only; we also refer to transfers of territory,
control over seas, and even implicit transfers of wealth and control linked to the marriages between royal
families across Europe up to the end of the 19th century.
10
Another possibility is to appeal to other predictions about outcomes such as von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable sets, as in Jordan [19] who studies pillage games. Those are coalitional games
in which a coalition with more wealth than another can make the other surrender all or part of it's
wealth at no cost. Pillage is clearly related to war, but diers in that it is costless and the outcome
is certain (the stronger takes from the weaker). See also Piccione and Rubinstein [28], who examine
distributions of resources across countries so that no country has any incentive to take from another,
where stronger countries can take costlessly and at will from weaker countries.
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calculations by countries (interpreted as unitary actors). In such models, if one allows
for bargaining and transfers war should not be possible. Our introduction of political
bias, as a crude model of the political process, allows us to study the bargaining between
countries in a way that makes non-trivial predictions about the possibility and circum-
stances leading to war. And, as discussed above, our modeling of political bias allows us
to do this without relying on poor information or incompatible beliefs among countries.
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith [5] analyze the variation across
countries in terms of the necessary support for a leader within the so called \selectorate".
In their model democratic leaders need a larger coalition to support them relative to non
democratic leaders. Keeping a larger coalition satised is more costly and hence losing a
war is relatively more costly for democratic leaders, and generally makes them less prone
to war. Thus, beside the fact that Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith
[5] do not analyze transfers, their theory is based on a political leader maintaining an
\internal" base, while ours is a complementary theory that focuses on political bias with
respect to \external" bargaining. The dierence is important, because, for example, in
their framework a democratic leader could decide to attack another country only in case
of overwhelming military advantage, whereas this is not the case when the primary cause
of war is political bias.
2 A Materialistic Model of War
We rst focus on a potential war between two countries in complete isolation. We denote
the countries by i and j. We return to the case of more countries below.
Let w
i
denote the total wealth of country i.
We model the technology of war in a simple way. If countries i and j go to war against
each other, country i prevails with probability p
i
(w
i
; w
j
), which is nondecreasing in w
i
and nonincreasing in w
j
.
11
When the wealth levels are clear, we let p
ij
denote p
i
(w
i
; w
j
).
The probability that country j prevails is p
ji
= 1   p
ij
. This simple form ignores the
possibility of a stalemate or any gradation of outcome, but still captures the essence of
war necessary to understand the incentives to go to war. Note that it is possible that
p
i
(w
i
; w
j
) 6= 1=2 when w
i
= w
j
. This allows, for instance, i to have some geographic,
population, or technological advantage or disadvantage.
In terms of the consequences of a war, we model the costs and benets as follows.
Regardless of winning or losing, a war costs a country a fraction C of its wealth. If a
country wins, then it gains a fraction G of the other country's wealth.
12
So, after a war
11
For empirical support of the hypothesis that the probability of winning depends on the relative
wealth levels (supposing that relative wealth levels determine relative levels of war mobilization), see
Harrison [16] and Tilly [34].
12
We could also add xed costs and/or benets. However, adding such parameters would add little to
the qualitative analysis of the interaction of political bias and war incentives.
5
against country j, country i's wealth is w
i
(1  C  G) if it loses and w
i
(1  C) +Gw
j
if
it wins.
When two countries meet, they each decide whether to go to war and if either decides
to go to war then a war occurs. As part of the decision process they may be able to make
transfers of resources or territory, or to make other concessions.
Let a
j
denote the fraction of w
j
controlled by the agent who is pivotal in the decisions
of country j. The fraction of the spoils of war that the pivotal agent might control can
dier from the fraction of the wealth that they hold, especially in non-democratic regimes
or in situations where there might be other sorts of benets from war (for instance, to a
pivotal military leader). The fraction of the spoils of war obtained by the pivotal agent
is a
0
j
. Thus, in the absence of any transfers the pivotal agent of a country j wishes to go
to war if and only if
13
(1  C)a
j
w
j
  (1  p
ji
)Ga
j
w
j
+ p
ji
Ga
0
j
w
i
> a
j
w
j
; (1)
where the left hand side is the expected value of a war and the right hand side is the
expected value of not going to war.
We can rewrite this so that the expected gains are on the left hand side and the
expected losses are on the right hand side:
p
ji
Ga
0
j
w
i
> [C + (1  p
ji
)G] a
j
w
j
: (2)
Political Bias
Let B
j
=
a
0
j
a
j
denote the ratio of the percentage that the pivotal decision making agent
stands to gain versus what he or she has at risk. We call this the political bias of country
j.
It is important to emphasize that although we model the relative gains and losses as
being proportional to wealth, the critical aspect of political bias in our model is that there
is a dierence between the incentives of the pivotal decision maker and the country as
a whole. This might, more generally, include things like potential power that a military
leader or politician might gain from winning a war, which would bias them away from
considering the pure costs and gains from war and can eectively be viewed as a distorted
view of gains (a
0
j
> a
j
). We also note that bias could similarly be less than 1. It could be,
for instance, that a politician fears losing oÆce due to a lost war, and this could manifest
itself in having the politician overly weight the losses of a war.
13
We examine this as if the other country is choosing not to go to war. Although this could turn out
to be a hypothetical comparison, it is still the relevant one as the equilibrium outcome (in the absence
of transfers) would be that the countries end up going to war if and only if the inequality holds for at
least one of the two countries' leaders.
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We can rewrite 2 as:
B
j
p
ji
Gw
i
> [C + (1  p
ji
)G]w
j
: (3)
This inequality, where the left hand side is the normalized expected gains (having
divided by a
j
) and the right hand side is the normalized expected costs, makes the role
of the bias quite clear. If B
j
> 1, then the leader overweights potential gains (since in
this case the rest of the country has a ratio at stake
(1 a
0
j
)
(1 a
j
)
< 1); while if it is less than 1
then it underweights potential gains.
We note some intuitive comparative statics.
The \tendency" of j to want to go to war (as measured in the range of parameter
values where j wants to go to war)
 is increasing in B
j
and G, and decreasing in C.
 depends only on the ratio of C=G and not on the absolute levels of either C or G.
 depends only on B
j
and not on the absolute levels of either a
j
or a
0
j
.
These show the intuitive comparative statics that a larger bias makes a country more
prone to war, as does an increase in the ratio of benets to costs of war. The eects of
the wealth levels, w
i
and w
j
, are ambiguous, as they enter through p
ji
, as well as directly.
For instance as w
i
increases, the potential spoils from war increase, but the probability of
winning for j decreases. Which of these two eects dominates depends on the technology
of war.
Given this dependence on the technology, for the purposes of illustration it is useful
to carry several examples of winning probabilities throughout.
Example 1 Proportional Probability of Winning
We say that the probability of winning is proportional (to relative wealths) if p
ji
=
w
j
w
j
+w
i
.
In this case, (3) can be rewritten as
(B
j
  1)Gw
i
w
i
+ w
j
> C: (4)
Remark 2 Under a proportional probability of winning, a politically unbiased country
never wishes to go to war. If B
j
> 1, then the tendency for j to want to go to war is
increasing in w
i
and decreasing in w
j
.
7
Example 3 Fixed Probability of Winning
We say that the probability of winning a war is xed if p
ji
=
1
2
, regardless of wealth
levels. This is an extreme case of situations in which wealth has no impact on the
probability of winning a war.
In that case, (3) can be rewritten as
B
j
w
i
w
j
> 1 +
2C
G
: (5)
Here an unbiased country could want to go to war, but only if its wealth is low compared
to the other country. In general, in this case a country's tendency to want to go to war
is higher if they have relatively less wealth.
Example 4 Higher Wealth Wins
We say that the higher wealth wins if p
ji
= 1 when w
j
> w
i
, p
ji
= 0 when w
j
< w
i
,
and p
ji
=
1
2
when w
j
= w
i
. This is another extreme case that captures situations in
which wealth is the critical determinant of the probability of winning a war.
In this case, a country j wishes to go to war (in the absence of transfers) whenever
w
j
> w
i
and gains outweigh losses, B
j
Gw
i
> Cw
j
. When wealths are equal, the expected
gains vs. losses condition is as in the xed case.
Example 2 and example 3 will also be referred to, respectively, as the extremely
insensitive and extremely sensitive war technologies.
3 The Interplay between Political Bias and Transfers
We begin with the important benchmark where no transfers are possible.
3.1 War incentives in the absence of transfers
When two countries meet it could be that neither country wishes to go to war, just one
country wishes to go to war, or both countries wish to go to war. If neither wishes it, then
clearly there is no war, and transfers would be irrelevant. If both countries wish war,
then there is a war and no transfers could possibly avoid it. The only situation where one
country might be willing to make transfers that could induce the other country to avoid
a war come when just one country has an interest in engaging in war. Let us rst make
some observations regarding the parameters that lead to the various possible scenarios,
and then come back to focus on transfers.
8
Proposition 5 No Transfers. Consider any xed w
i
, w
j
and p
ij
.
(I) If B
i
= B
j
= 1, then at most one country wishes to go to war regardless of the
other parameters.
(II) Fixing any ratio
C
G
, if B
i
and B
j
are both suÆciently large, then both countries wish
to go to war.
(III) Fixing any B
i
and B
j
, if
C
G
is large enough, then neither country wishes to go to
war.
Proof: See the appendix.
For xed biases B
i
> 1, B
j
> 1, and a xed ratio
C
G
, whether or not one or both
countries wish to go to war depends on the technology p
i
(; ) and the wealth levels in
ways that may not be purely monotone.
3.2 Transfers to avoid a war: the commitment case
We now examine situations where in the absence of any transfers one country would like
to go to war but the other would not.
When transfers are made from country i to country j, we assume that the decision
maker in country j gets a
0
j
of the transfer, and the decision maker in country i loses a
i
of the transfer. Thus, decision makers' biases towards transfers are the same as towards
gains and losses from war. This is not critical to any of the results, as it is only important
that a bias be present somewhere. We make this assumption to be consistent with gains
and losses.
14
The aim is to identify when it is that transfers will avoid a war. That is, we would
like to know when is it that:
 in the absence of transfers j wants to go to war with i,
 i prefers to pay t
ij
> 0 to j rather than going to war, and
 j would prefer to have peace and the transfer t
ij
to going to war.
It is important to note that when we say that transfers avoid a war, we are imposing
the constraint that a war would have occurred in the absence of any transfers.
15
14
For instance, our results still hold qualitatively (with some dierences in the exact equations), if we
assume that decision makers evaluate all transfers (in or out) at a rate of a
j
(or all at a
0
j
).
15
There are other possibilities that arise as well, that we ignore. For instance, if two countries both
have high biases, their leaders might benet from making transfers in both directions - as each is able to
more easily keep a larger share of the transfers they receive. Essentially, they loot each other's countries.
While this is plausible within the model, it is not something that we investigate seriously.
9
We start with the case where countries can commit to peace conditional on the transfer
t
ij
. This is a situation where the countries can sign some (internationally) enforceable
treaty so that they will not go to war conditional on the transfer. In the absence of
such enforceability or commitment, it could be that i makes the transfer to j and then j
invades anyway. We deal with the case of no commitment in the next section.
Proposition 6 Consider a case where j wishes to go to war (in the absence of any
transfers) while i does not. Holding all else equal, the range of relative costs to gains
C
G
where a transfer can be made that will avoid a war increases (in the sense of set inclusion)
when
 B
i
decreases,
 p
ji
increases, and
 w
i
=w
j
increases (holding p
ji
xed).
16
Proof: See the appendix.
The proposition is fairly intuitive. Reducing B
i
makes i less likely to want to go to
war, and to gain less from a war, and hence willing to make larger transfers to avoid
it. Increasing p
ji
or w
i
=w
j
(holding p
ji
xed) have the same eect, and also increase the
range where j would like to go to war in the absence of any transfers. So, for instance,
a technological change that exogenously favors one country in a war (an increase in p
ji
)
makes transfers more likely to avoid war, especially when the challenger is more politically
biased and/or poorer.
17
It is important to note that it need not be the wealthier country
that is the challenger. A poor but politically biased country can extract transfers.
The proof of the proposition appears in the appendix, where we show that the fol-
lowing condition:
p
ji
(1 +B
j
w
i
w
j
)  1 >
C
G
>
(1  p
ji
)(B
i
B
j
  1)
(1 +B
j
w
i
w
j
)
; (6)
characterizes the situations where transfers avoid a war. The left hand side corresponds
to country j wanting to go to war in the absence of any transfers, while the right hand
side corresponds to the willingness of i to make a transfer that would induce j to no longer
want to go to war. The eect of the political bias of the potential attacking country j,
16
If we do not hold p
ji
xed, then things are ambiguous, as larger relative wealth makes i better able
to pay, but also better able to win.
17
Note that this description is consistent with some interpretations of the behavior of the dictator of
North Korea (even though there is also a security concern): The biased leader of a poor country with
access to a potential jump in the probability of winning a war with a neighbor may obtain transfers
from other countries. Such transfers may depend on whether commitment problems can be overcome,
something that we come back to below.
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Bj
, is ambiguous. It makes country j more aggressive, but also leads i to be willing to
make larger transfers. Which eect dominates depends on a variety of factors.
In the case of two unbiased countries, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 7 [Unbiased Peace] Two unbiased countries (B
i
= B
j
= 1) will never go
to war if they can make transfers to each other and the receiver of a transfer can commit
not to go to war after receiving the transfer.
Proof: See the appendix.
The result is easy to understand. War imposes costs, and so when bargaining is
unbiased, the total pie from avoiding a war is larger than the total pie from going to war.
Thus transfers avoid a war. The formal proof comes from noting that the right hand side
of (6) becomes 0 when B
i
= B
j
= 1, so one country is always willing to buy the other
o. So either war is avoided because neither wanted it in the rst place, or because one
country is willing to pay the other o (recalling that at most one unbiased country ever
wants to go to war).
Proposition 7 identies a new explanation for the observation that democracies rarely
go to war with one another. Most of the explanations of this fact in the literature concern
internal checks and balances within a democracy, or the cultural norms and relative
aÆnities that one democracy has for another. Here we point out that two unbiased
countries (and hence two democracies to the extent that they have smaller biases than
dictatorships, at least on average) never go to war because they can always nd some
transfer (perhaps bargaining under the threat of war) that makes it irrational to go to
war.
It is important to note that this conclusion is only true for two politically unbiased
countries and is not true if either country is politically biased. Also, this further makes
the point that it is not democracy that is the key determinant of peace, but absence of
political bias .
Let us also say a few words about commitment. Commitment could come from inter-
national organizations that could enforce peace agreements (e.g., the U.N.); or alterna-
tively from longer-term reputation eects. If a country is to face a number of countries
over time, then by abiding by its promises it will earn future transfers, while otherwise it
will end up ghting a series of wars. Clearly, if transfers are preferable to war in each case,
then the country would prefer to have a series of transfers over a series of wars. With
suÆcient attention to the future, the country would prefer to abide by its agreements,
rather than to go to war and lose all possibilities of transfers in the future.
We return to some of our benchmark cases, to get a better feeling for when transfers
will avoid a war.
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In the benchmark case where p
ji
=
1
2
regardless of wealth levels (Example 3), (6)
implies that there exists a range of values of
C
G
such that transfers help avoid war if and
only if
B
i
< B
j
 
w
i
w
j
!
2
:
So in this case it is very clear that transfers help the most when B
i
is small, B
j
is large,
and/or
w
i
w
j
is large. These correspond to situations where the transferring country is less
biased, the aggressor is more biased, and the wealth at risk for the transferring country
relative to the aggressor is larger.
In the other extreme case where the higher wealth wins (Example 4), and when j has
a relative wealth advantage, (6) simplies to
B
j
w
i
w
j
>
C
G
> 0:
Here, war is again \more avoidable" with larger bias B
j
and larger w
i
=w
j
(which leads
to larger relative transfers), but now B
i
is irrelevant as i is sure to lose.
3.3 The no-commitment case
Let us now suppose that a country cannot commit to avoid a war if it receives transfers.
As discussed above, commitment can relate to a number of factors: the presence or
lack of international organizations which (have the incentives to) enforce agreements, the
patience of the challenger, the likelihood of meeting other countries in the future from
which the challenger might gain from having maintained a reputation for abiding by its
agreements, etc. So, a lack of commitment power might be due to a variety of reasons.
In the no commitment case, to avoid a war not only does a transfer have to be such
that the potential aggressor is willing to forego the current opportunity for a war, but
it also needs to be such that after the transfer has been made a war is no longer in the
aggressor's interest. Transfers do three things:
 They make the target poorer and less appealing,
 They make the challenger richer and have more to lose,
 They increase the probability that the challenger will win.
Here, we can see that there are countervailing eects. If the probability is not aected
too much by a transfer, then it is possible for transfers to avoid a war, as transfers can
change the wealths of the two countries so as to make it no longer in one country's interest
to invade the other.
There are a number of things that we observe about the no commitment case.
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First, we can show that the situations where war is avoided due to transfers in the
case of no commitment are a strict subset of those when there is commitment. In both
cases, the transfers that the potential target country is willing to make are the same.
The only dierences are from the challenger's perspective. The dierence between the
two cases is that in the commitment case, a potential aggressor compares the value of no
war (their wealth plus any transfers) to what they would gain from a war in the absence
of any transfers; while in the no commitment case a potential aggressor compares the
value of no war (again, their wealth plus any transfers) to what they would gain from a
war after transfers have been made. The value of a war to an aggressor after they have
received transfers is strictly higher than the value of a war before any transfers, as the
probability of winning is weakly higher and in the case where transfers have already been
made, the aggressor gets to keep a portion of those transfers regardless of whether they
win or lose, while in the other case they only get that wealth if they win.
Next, the no commitment case has the following interesting feature. There are some
transfers t
ij
> 0 which would not avoid a war, but yet there are lower transfers, t
0
ij
where
t
ij
> t
0
ij
> 0, which would avoid a war. Thus, it is possible that too high a transfer will
lead to war while a lower transfer will avoid a war. This can be true in a case where
the changes in transfers lead to substantial enough dierences in the probability that the
challenger wins the war. Larger transfers can lead the country making the transfers to
be more vulnerable in terms of being more likely to lose a war, and thus higher transfers
can end up leading to a war that lower transfers might have averted. This is illustrated
in the following example.
First, we note that a transfer t
ij
from country i to j makes it so that j does not want
to go to war after having received the transfer in the case of no commitment if
18
p
0
ji
B
j
G(w
i
  t
ij
)  (C + (1  p
0
ji
)G)(w
j
+B
j
t
ij
); (7)
where p
0
ji
= p
ji
(w
j
+ t
ij
; w
i
  t
ij
).
Example 8 Smaller Transfers Avoid a War
Let B
i
= 1, B
j
= 4, w
i
= w
j
= 100, C =
1
10
and G =
1
10
. Have p
ij
(w;w) =
1
2
.
Note that in this case (3) is satised, so initially j wishes to go to war with i.
We estimate (see (14) in the appendix) that i would be willing to make a maximal
transfer of

t
ij
= 10 to avoid war. In the case of commitment, we can then check that this
would avoid war (see (12) in the appendix, which is then satised).
Suppose that p
ji
(110; 90) = 3=4. Thus, if a transfer of

t
ij
= 10 is made, then j would
still wish to go to war after the transfer as (7) is not satised, and so the transfer would
not avoid a war.
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This is simply a rewriting of (3) where i's wealth is w
i
  t
ij
, and where j's wealth from the biased
decision maker's perspective is w
j
+B
j
t
ij
but enters into the war technology as w
j
+ t
ij
.
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However, consider a smaller transfer of t = 8. Suppose that p
ji
(108; 92) = 1=2 + ".
For small enough ", (7) is satised and so this smaller t avoids a war!
This means that in general we can no longer adopt the method used to prove results in
the last section, where we deduce the maximal possible transfer that a country is willing
to make to avoid a war and see if that avoids a war. Without specifying the p function,
one cannot determine which transfers will avoid a war.
What we do know is that:
 transfers can still avoid a war,
 the set of parameter values where transfers avoid a war is a subset of the commit-
ment case,
 the set of parameters for which war is avoided grows as
C
G
increases;
 The set of parameters for which war is avoided grows as B
i
decreases.
The fact that smaller B
i
helps avoid war is due to the fact that this results in an
increase in the set of transfers that i is willing to make. The eect of
C
G
increasing is
clear, as it helps make both countries wish to avoid a war. The eects of B
j
and w
i
, w
j
are ambiguous, as again the technology of war (p
ji
) matters.
There are cases where we can deduce things about the ability of transfers to avoid
war. The key to Example 8 is that there is a large change in probability due to a larger
transfer, so there is a sort of convexity of the probability of winning function. If the
probability function is not aected at all (e.g., Example 3) or are proportional, as in
Example 1, then we can examine the maximal transfers as the relevant benchmark. The
possibilities of avoiding war are still reduced relative to the commitment case, but the
comparative statics are then similar.
In particular, the unbiased peace result still holds for the case of a proportional p
function.
Proposition 9 [Unbiased Peace Without Commitment] If the probability of winning is
proportional to relative wealths, then two unbiased countries (B
i
= B
j
= 1) will never go
to war if they can make transfers to each other (even without commitment).
Proof: In the case of proportional winning probabilities, we know that an unbiased
country will not wish to go to war with or without transfers.
This is clearly not true for all probability of winning functions. What is subtle, is
that while it is true for proportional probabilities, it is not true for probability functions
that are either less sensitive to relative changes in wealths or more sensitive to relative
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changes in wealths. This is seen as follows. First, consider a case where p is constant and
equal to
1
2
. In this case, a smaller country will wish to go to war with a larger one, as it
has relatively little at risk and much to gain. The transfer that a larger country is willing
to make is relative to its expected losses from a war. After having received a transfer the
small country could still have relatively more to gain from a war than it expects to lose.
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At the other extreme, where the higher wealth wins for sure, it is the larger country that
is the aggressor. The smaller country is willing to pay something to avoid a war, but not
its entire wealth. After having received a transfer, the larger country can still want to go
to war provided there is enough wealth left in the smaller country to justify the cost of
war, as the larger country will win for sure.
20
3.4 Endogenous Bias
As political bias aects a country's decisions of whether to go to war and whether it
receives or makes transfers, it is a critical dimension of a country. Most importantly, it
could be that the representative citizen (that is, an unbiased citizen) of a country would
prefer to have a biased leader. As such, we ask which political bias a country prefers
its leader to have, as viewed from the perspective of a representative (unbiased) citizen.
This is not only relevant because some countries choose their leaders, but also because it
tells us which country leaders might best benet its citizens.
We start by noting that in the absence of any transfers, the representative citizen
of a country always prefers an unbiased leader over any other leader. In the absence of
any transfers, the only decision is whether or not to go to war, and the representative
(unbiased) citizen, would prefer to have a decision maker who makes the same decisions
the citizen would. An unbiased decision maker makes the same decisions that the repre-
sentative citizen would, while someone with any bias would make dierent decisions in
at least some contexts.
Now consider the case in which transfers are available and there is commitment. Here,
having a biased leader can potentially benet a country, as such a leader may extract
transfers from other countries.
21
It is useful to start with an example.
Example 10 Endogenous Bias and a Hawk-Dove Outcome
19
For a numerical example, suppose that w
j
= 1 and w
i
= 10, and that C = :1 and G = :2. The
maximal transfer that i is willing to make is 1.9. If such transfers were made, the smaller country would
have wealth 2.9 and the larger 8.1. The smaller country would still wish to go to war.
20
For a numerical example, suppose that w
i
= 20 and w
j
= 25, and C = :1 and G = :4. Here the
maximal transfer that i is willing to make is 10. After such a transfer, the wealths are w
i
= 10 and
w
j
= 35. A war then costs the larger country 3.5, but yields 4 in gains (as it wins for sure), and so the
larger country will still go to war.
21
This can be seen as an example of a delegation game, where players might like to have agents play
for them who have dierent preferences from their own (e.g., see Fershtman and Judd [12]). See also
Smith [32].
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Let w
1
= w
2
= 100 and p(w;w) = 1=2. Let C = 0:1 and G = 0:2.
In the absence of transfers, a country would choose to attack the other if and only if
its leader's bias is above 2. It is also useful to note that an unbiased leader is willing to
pay up to 10 to avoid war.
So let us examine what happens for dierent combinations of biases of the leaders. To
keep things simple, let us suppose that the bias levels that can be chosen are either 1 or
4. If both countries have leaders with bias 4, then war is unavoidable. If both countries
have leaders with bias 1, then no war occurs and no transfers are made. If one country
has a leader with bias 1 and the other with bias 4, then a transfer of at least and no more
than 10 occurs and the countries do not go to war.
In such a situation, we can think of \equilibrium" biases. Two countries choosing
their leaders' biases in this example are essentially playing a Hawk-Dove game. The
unique (pure-strategy) equilibrium is for one of the countries to have a biased leader and
the other not to.
More generally, the presence of transfers provides incentives for countries to select
leaders with high bias (more hawkish looking than the citizens would want in the absence
of strategic considerations). However, the example above suggests that this cannot be
generally true for both countries, since the representative citizens prefer to avoid war.
Hence the model suggests a simple reason for the coexistence of endogenously biased and
unbiased leaders in equilibrium.
We can state this more generally. Consider two countries, and x w
1
; w
2
; C;G; and
p. As there is a continuum of transfers that would avoid war in a case where war would
occur in the absence of transfers, let us follow the convention where the minimum transfer
to avoid war is made. An equilibrium is a pair b
1
; b
2
such that for each i there does not
exist any b
0
i
such that the expected utility of an unbiased citizen of country i is greater
under b
0
i
; b
j
than under b
i
; b
j
.
We remark that there will always be some equilibria where war is not avoided. For
instance, if the other country chooses a suÆciently high bias, then the rst country is
willing to as well, as war is essentially inevitible. However, there also exist equilibria
where war is avoidable.
Proposition 11 (I) In the presence of transfers with commitment, there always exists
an equilibrium that avoids war.
(II) If in the absence of transfers the representative citizen of at least one country would
strictly prefer to avoid war, and assuming C > 0, , then in any equilibrium that avoids
war at least one of the two countries has a leader with a positive bias.
Proof: (I) Start with biases of 1 for both countries. By our unbiased peace result, war
would be avoided under transfers with commitment. Suppose, without loss of generality,
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that country 2 is the one that would weakly prefer not to go to war in the absence of
transfers. Raise the bias of country 1 until the point where the leader of the country 1 is
exactly indierent between going to war and accepting the maximal transfer country 2 is
willing to make. This bias for country 1 and a bias of 1 for country 2 is an equilibrium.
(II) Follows from the observation that if at least one country (say 2) would strictly prefer
to avoid war, then if biases are both no more than 1, by raising its bias country 1 could
extract larger transfers from country 2 while still avoiding war.
The above result gives us an idea that there is a well-dened sense in which countries
would prefer to have biased leaders. This is tempered by introducing uncertainty into the
world. If there is some uncertainty as to the other countries that will be faced in terms
of bias, or wealth, or technology, then it could be that a high bias leads to wars, which a
representative citizen would prefer to avoid. A representative citizen can generally only
lose by having a leader with bias lower than 1 (as the only time that changes outcomes is
where the leader would make transfers that are larger than the citizen would be willing
to make to avoid war). Thus, we can still deduce that in any sort of equilibrium with
uncertainty, the leaning would still be towards choosing leaders with higher bias, and
exactly how high that bias would be would depend on the distribution of other countries
and circumstances to be faced. The availability of transfers and enforceable treaties may
therefore be themselves indirect causes of war, insofar as they give ex-ante incentives to
(s)elect biased leaders.
4 Stability and Alliances
Let us now consider settings where there are many countries.
4.1 Bilateral Stability
Consider some set of countries f1; : : : ; ng, their respective wealths (w
1
; : : : ; w
n
) and biases
(B
1
; : : : ; B
n
), a technology of war that is specied for each pair ij, p
ij
, and relative costs
and gains C and G. We say that such a conguration of countries is bilaterally stable if
there would be no war between any two of the countries if they met, even in the absence
of any transfers.
Bilateral stability is characterized by having (3) fail to hold for each pair of countries.
We can see directly from (3) that if the relative costs of war (C=G) are high enough,
then we will have bilateral stability. Beyond that, we need to know more about the
probability of winning function and how that compares to the biases. The following
proposition outlines one case where bilateral stability holds.
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Proposition 12 [Democratic Stability] If all countries are politically unbiased and the
probability of winning a war is proportional to wealth, then the countries are bilaterally
stable.
Proof: It follows directly from Remark 2.
We can also say something about how biased countries can be while still having
bilateral stability. The following proposition works for more general war technologies,
but starting from a point where all countries have equal wealths.
Proposition 13 If all countries have equal wealth and p
ij
is symmetric,
22
then the con-
guration is bilaterally stable if and only if B
j
 1 + 2
C
G
.
Proof: It follows from (3), setting p
ji
= 1=2 and w
i
= w
j
.
Beyond these propositions, bilateral stability can be directly characterized by bilateral
checks of (3).
4.2 Coalitional Stability
Another question we address when examining many countries concerns alliances and
coalitional stability.
Alliances can be assumed to work as follows. When a set K of countries form an
alliance, the decision maker from country i still has a
i
w
i
in terms of wealth at risk (and
thus loses (C + G)a
i
w
i
if a war is lost), and shares a
0
i
w
i
P
j2K
w
j
of the spoils of war or
transfers. Alliances decisions are unanimous (pure collective action). Each country's de-
cision maker must be willing to undertake an oensive war in order for it to happen. The
default is not to attack unless the coalition is unanimous about doing so, which reects
the idea that the coalition might dissolve otherwise.
23
The maximum total transfer that
an alliance might make in order to avoid a war is the maximum sum of transfers across
its members, such that each would be willing to contribute their part in order to avoid a
war.
22
p
ij
is symmetric if p
ij
(w;w
0
) = p
ji
(w
0
; w).
23
As explained in Maggi and Morelli [25], a unanimity requirement for collective action is the norm
when the participation of all allies is necessary and the value of future expected cooperation with the
other allies is not suÆcient to convince a dissenting member to go along with the decision of a majority.
When the participation of all allies is not necessary, then the formation of a \coalition of the willing"
can suÆce. We do not consider this distinction here. See Morrow [26] for the view that alliances entail
a pledge of future coordination between the allies. Note also that the degree of consensus necessary in
an alliance could be dierent depending on whether it is a defensive or an oensive alliance. A world
with large defensive alliances and small oensive ones could be quite stable.
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The technology of war is presumed to be given by a function p which only depends
on the total wealths of the warring alliances.
With this structure of alliances in mind, there are a number of dierent things we can
consider. We can consider whether there exist congurations of alliances such that the
alliances are bilaterally stable (no alliance wishes to attack any other alliance). We can
also consider whether there exist congurations of alliances that are immune to deviations
by any subset of countries (who might quit their current alliance and join with others
to form a new alliance). We can consider weaker deviations, asking whether there is any
single country who wishes to quit its current alliance and would be unanimously accepted
into some other alliance. Finally, we can dierentiate between oensive and defensive
alliances.
Let us begin with a couple of examples that make clear some of the issues that arise.
The rst example illustrates why there are interesting alliance issues that arise and
why we might want to move beyond simply studying bilateral stability.
Example 14
Consider three equal sized countries with w
1
= w
2
= w
3
and B
1
= B
2
= B
3
. If
the corresponding B
i
's are not too high, this could be bilaterally stable. However, this
is not necessarily coalitionally stable. Two countries might have an incentive to form
an (oensive) alliance and exclude the third country. This could strengthen them so
that they might either wish to go to war regardless of any transfers, and both benet in
expected terms from doing so, or obtain a transfer. For example, in the case of unbiased
countries and higher wealth winning, two countries that band together expect to gain
from going to war with the third country.
The next example illustrates that it could be that countries form alliances not for
oensive purposes (as above), but instead for defensive purposes.
Example 15
Consider three countries where one's wealth is twice the size of each of the others.
By forming an alliance, for some choices of B
i
's, the two smaller countries avoid being
attacked or having to pay a transfer. For example, if it is the larger wealth that wins,
then separately the countries are sure to lose a war, while allied they have an even chance
of winning.
Clearly, from the examples above, it is possible that there will not exist any con-
guration of countries and alliances that is bilaterally stable (so that no alliance would
attack another in the absence of any transfers).
These examples also suggest that the incentive to form an alliance (oensive and
defensive respectively) derives from the sensitivity of the p function. If p were independent
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of wealth, then countries would not gain at all from forming an alliance. If the probability
of winning were proportional to the relative wealths for any pair of potential opponents
(countries or alliances), then if countries were not too biased, the core would be very
large, as unbiased countries or alliances would not wish to go to war in the face of such
a technology. Thus, the incentives to form alliances are more prevalent when relative
wealth swings the anticipated outcome more dramatically.
When we allow for congurations with heterogeneity of bias levels, it is diÆcult to
characterize conditions for the non emptiness of the core, or to determine which alliances
are most likely to form. However, we can still explore a few things.
It is possible to have alliance congurations that are bilaterally stable and such that
no individual country would strictly want to quit its existing alliance either to be alone
or to join another alliance. Let us call such an alliance conguration individually stable.
Let W denote the total wealth of an alliance.
Proposition 16 Consider any parameters C and G, and any continuous p such that
p(w;W ) < w=W when w=W approaches 0.
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If there exist at least two countries with
biases close enough to 1, biases of countries are bounded above, and there are enough
countries such that each country's wealth is suÆciently small relative to the total world
wealth, then there exists a division of countries into two alliances that is individually
stable. In such a situation, a single alliance of all countries is also individually stable.
The proof is relatively straightforward, and hence we simply outline it. Separate the
two countries with lowest biases. Then around each, form an alliance so that the total
wealths in the two alliances are as close to each other as possible. Given the continuity
of p, the probability of either alliance winning a war approaches
1
2
. With a small enough
bias, the least biased country in each alliance will prefer not to go to war. Consider
any country switching alliances. Their wealth, if small enough relative to total wealth,
will make too small a change in probabilities of outcomes to change the incentives of the
alliances.
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The only remaining possibility is that a country could gain from autarchy.
However, in that case, providing countries are small enough relative to total wealth, even
with maximal bias, (3) fails to hold for the departing country, as its probability of winning
is so small relative to the maximal potential gains that it will not have an incentive to
go to war with one of the (large) alliances.
Comparing the situation described in example 14 with the constructed stability of a
pair of alliances in proposition 16, one can conclude that in our model a \bipolar" system
will (under the right circumstances) be stable when a multipolar one may not be.
26
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More precisely, consider p such that p(w;W )W=w ! 0 as w ! 0, for any xed W > 0.
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The only possible exception is if the least biased country leaves and the remaining countries are
strongly biased, but then that can only lead to the biased country alliance wanting to attack the other
alliance, which does not benet the country that switched.
26
This is in line with the general concerns about tripolar systems, for instance, as expressed by
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5 Further Results and Discussion
As should be clear from some of the above analysis, this basic model of political bias
opens the door for much future research. Let us comment on a few of the more obvious
areas for further exploration.
First of all, one can examine the predictions of the model empirically. One can do
this by a structural t of the model, estimating wealths, costs, gains, and war technology
(p) directly from the data, and either imputing the biases or estimating them based on
other political variables.
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One can also develop variations on the model which endogenize various parameters
(other than bias) that we have taken to be exogenous. Let us mention a few ideas in this
direction.
 The model could be coupled with a growth model so that wealths change over
time. As wealths change, so will incentives to go to war (and incentives to capture
territory to help with growth), and one could track how the economics of growth
interacts with the incentives for international conict.
 One could enrich the technology of war to allow for investments in arms, so that
the probability of winning a war depended on military spending and not simply on
wealth directly.
 We could enrich the model to endogenize the timing and choice of confrontation,
so that we do not only examine stability or the choices of two countries once faced
with war, but also more completely model how it is that two countries start to
consider a war and how this might depend on the more general environment.
5.1 Dynamics
As our analysis has been static, and yet international relations are clearly dynamic, we
close with some observations on this topic.
The most basic and important aspect that dynamics introduces is that as countries get
richer, their incentives change. As a country j has won past wars, three things happen.
First, its wealth increases, and so the w
ij
= w
i
=w
j
ratios it faces will decrease. This in
turn has a second eect which is that p
ji
increases. Third, as more wealth is acquired,
the pivotal agent's percentage share of the wealth increases and so B
j
decreases. To see
this, note that before a war the agent's share is a
j
. After the war, if the country wins,
the agent's share is
a
j
(1  C)w
j
+ a
0
j
Gw
i
(1  C)w
j
+Gw
i
: (8)
Kaplan [21]. For counterarguments about the special stability features of tripolar systems, see Ostrom
and Aldrich [27] and Wagner [35].
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Another possible application and testing of the model involves strikes and biases of union leaders.
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If a
0
j
> a
j
, then this new share is larger than a
j
. Thus, the new B
j
is a
0
j
over this new
share, and so as a country keeps winning wars, B
j
will decrease.
Let us examine the implications of these changes over time. We know from (3) that
a country will want to go to war (without consideration of transfers) if
p
ji
>
1 +
C
G
1 +B
j
w
i
w
j
: (9)
As we see from above, if a country has become wealthier through the winning of past
wars, then the right hand side of this expression will have increased as both B
j
and w
ij
will have decreased (if we are holding the wealth of a given opponent constant). On the
other hand, the left hand side will also go up as p
ji
increases.
While we cannot say what the short-term eects of this are, we can say that a country
will not wish to go on going to war for too long. This follows from noting that p
ji
is
bounded above by 1, while w
ij
can go to 0. As a country becomes much wealthier than
other countries, it no longer desires to go to war, as the right hand side of (9) will converge
to 1+
C
G
, while the left hand side is bounded above by 1. Essentially, even if the country
is sure to win the war, it does not wish to go to war because the costs outweigh the spoils
of war against a much smaller country.
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Thus, the model displays a novel \endogenous
limit to the expansion of an empire," in contrast with the systemic explanations in the
literature.
Interestingly, depending on the technology of war, as one country becomes much
wealthier it may no longer wish to go to war, but it may become an attractive target
for smaller countries, since they may have much to gain and little to lose.
29
Whether or
not this is the case depends on how fast p
ji
increases in w
j
. In the long run (i.e., after
each pair of countries has faced the temptation of war or gone to war suÆciently many
times), a war between countries of very dierent wealths (winners and losers of past
wars respectively) will be possible only if the poorer country wants it. Finding situations
where it is the stronger countries that would be the aggressors, would require some of
the other extensions mentioned above, such as changing technologies, growth, or changes
in political bias.
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Appendix
Let w
ji
= w
j
=w
i
.
Proof of Proposition 5: We know that (3) is the condition to satisfy for j to be willing
to go to war against i in the absence of transfers. Similarly, country i wishes to go to
war with country j if and only if
1  p
ji
>
1 +
C
G
1 +B
i
w
ji
: (10)
Part (III) follows directly from (3) and (10), as both right hand sides are increasing
in
C
G
.
Next, note that from (3) and (10) it follows that both countries want to go to war if
and only if
1 
1 +
C
G
1 +B
i
w
ji
> p
ji
>
1 +
C
G
1 +B
j
w
ij
: (11)
It is clear that if B
i
= B
j
= 1 then the inequalities in (11) require that
1 
1 +
C
G
1 + w
ji
>
1 +
C
G
1 + w
ij
:
To see this is impossible, rewrite the above inequality as
1 + w
ij
 
1 +
C
G
w
ji
> 1 +
C
G
:
This simplies to
 w
ij
C
G
>
C
G
;
which is clearly impossible. This proves (I).
The proof of (II) derives from the following observation: the left hand side of (11)
converges to 1 as B
i
gets large and the right hand side of (11) converges to 0 as B
j
gets
large.
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Proof of Proposition 6: As j wishes to go to war but i does not, (3) holds but (10)
does not. The condition that needs to be satised for country j to no longer wish to go
to war against i if oers t
ij
> 0 is
(1  C  G)a
j
w
j
+ p
ji
G(a
j
w
j
+ a
0
j
w
i
)  a
j
w
j
+ a
0
j
t
ij
:
This simplies to
p
ji
G(w
j
+B
j
w
i
)  (C +G)w
j
+B
j
t
ij
(12)
Similarly, the condition for i to be willing to make a transfer t
ij
> 0 to avoid a war is
(1  p
ji
)G(w
i
+B
i
w
j
)  (C +G)w
i
  t
ij
(13)
Note that we assume that the pivotal agent in country j gets the same proportion (a
0
j
)
of t
ij
as they would if it were a spoil of war, and the pivotal agent in country i pays the
same proportion (a
i
) of t
ij
as it risks of its wealth in a war.
Let

t
ij
be the transfer that makes country i (who wishes to avoid war) indierent
between going to war and paying such a transfer, i.e., the transfer that makes (13) hold
as equality. In other words,

t
ij
> 0 is the maximum transfer that i is willing to make in
order to avoid the war. Then

t
ij
= (C +G)w
i
  (1  p
ji
)G(w
i
+B
i
w
j
) (14)
Substituting (14) in (12), a transfer can be made so that country j no longer wishes
to go to war if
p
ji
G(w
j
+B
j
w
i
)  (C +G)w
j
+B
j
(C +G)w
i
  B
j
(1  p
ji
)G(w
i
+B
i
w
j
):
This can be rewritten as
C
G

(1  p
ji
)(B
i
B
j
  1)
1 +B
j
w
ij
(15)
When we combine this with (3) we obtain the following characterization of when transfers
avoid a war:
p
ji
(1 +B
j
w
ij
)  1 >
C
G
>
(1  p
ji
)(B
i
B
j
  1)
(1 +B
j
w
ij
)
: (16)
The comparative statics in the proposition are then clear.
Proof of Proposition 7: Given proposition 5(I), we know that when two unbiased
countries meet, the situation without transfers is either such that they both wish to
avoid war or that one country alone wishes to go to war. If the situation is the former,
we are done. If it is the latter case, then assume without loss of generality that j is the
one who wants to go to war and i is the one who does not. We have established above
that in this case the availability of transfers eliminates the incentive of j to go to war if
(15) holds. Thus, the result follows, noting that the RHS of (15) is 0 with two unbiased
countries.
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